This study proposes a programmable system-on-chip (PSoC) 
Introduction
Privacy means an ability to protect personal secrets and/or a state of being hidden from public view [1] [2] . Before the advent of computers, privacy protection was usually achieved by using key locks to protect physical resources. With the developed computer and Internet technologies, the traditional key locks are not effective for privacy protection because most organizations, including commercial and social organizations, store data on computers. Specifically, data is shared among different institutions via the Internet and a large amount of commerce is electronically conducted. These advanced technologies are able to bring more convenience to life, but they also bring an increased risk of abusing or disclosing personal data, thereby resulting in the privacy threat: identity theft.
Identity theft is usually initiated by disloyal insiders or adversaries stealing one's identifying data stored in a database or transmitted on a network [3] . Currently, identity theft is one of the fastest growing crimes in the United States. An estimated 500,000 to 700,000 Americans fall victims to identity theft every year, and losses resulting from identity theft cost around 3.5 billion dollars in 2002 and the losses rose to over 8 billion dollars in 2006 [4] [5] . In other countries such as the United Kingdom, this problem is just as urgent as in the United States. Consequently, an individual may acquire a bad reputation due to improper disclosure of his personal data, thus requiring extra money, time, and effort to recover his reputation and credit standing. An average of $808 and 175 hours of effort is needed for a person to put things right [6] .
One risk of abuse or improper disclosure of personal data may occur in e-commerce services. For example, an individual may register his identity information including name, address, social security number, and account details in an institution's database. The administrator of the institution will use the registration information to make decisions on supplying data in response to service requests from the user. In the absence of effective protection on users' personal data, their identity information is susceptible to being misused by unauthorized people or organizations.
As described above, the abuse and/or improper disclosure of an individual's highly private material would bring him unexpected financial or physical losses. This study proposes a privacy enhancing mechanism using programmable system on chip (PSoC) technology to solve the privacy-protection problem in the computer world. The objective of this study is to prevent unauthorized disclosure and improper modification of one's computerized personal data during transit and at rest. In the following sections of this study, Section II reviews some related studies. Section III describes the proposed PSoC-based security technology. The experimental results are shown in Section IV. Finally, the conclusions are summarized in Section V.
Technology background
Cryptography is commonly classified into three parts: un-key, secret key, and public key cryptography. Un-key cryptography uses a function to map, hash, or transform a message into different presentation by mathematical operations, such as permutations and involutions, for data integrity. Secure hash algorithm (SHA) [7] and message digest (MD5) [8] are two typical researches which usually condense a message of any size down to a small fixed-size block of messages by using bitwise logical AND, inclusive-OR, eXclusive-OR, and complement operations.
Secret key cryptography, symmetric cryptography, encrypts/decrypts a message using a secret key shared between two communicating parties. A typical example named data encryption standard (DES) uses a secret key to transform a plaintext which is grouped into contiguous fix-length blocks via substitution and permutation operations. The length of the ciphertext is the same as that of the plaintext. However, it is insecure because a DES key can be recovered in 56 hours [9] . Niinimaki and Forsstron [10] proposed an electronic prescription system using this cryptography, which stored a secret key in a smart card to prevent hackers or unauthorized people from disclosing users' passwords. In general, such type of cryptography performs efficiently but it has key distribution problem and requires periodically changing secret keys for better security.
Public key cryptography, asymmetric cryptography, encrypts/decrypts a message by using a mathematically related key pair, a public key and private key, in which the key used for encryption is different from decryption. The public key is open publicly and the private key needs to be held only by its owner securely. This cryptography is usually used for key encryption/ decryption, digital signature generation, and key exchange. RSA [11] , DSA [12] , and Diffie-Hellman [13] use this cryptography for data encryption/ decryption, data authentication, and key exchange. RSA is based on integer factorization operations whereas DSA and Diffie-Hellman are based on discrete logarithm operations. Blobel and Pharow [14] proposed a public key cryptosystem that stored the keys in a smartcard to protect medical data from network intruders. Meyer and Lundgren [15] produced the digital signature of a use's authentication code to increase the security of healthcare networks. Ohta and Okamoto [16] introduced multi-signature schemes based on elliptic curve mathematics to ensure the security of digital signatures. However, this cryptography requires timeconsuming computations in generating keys.
Menasce [17] examined the security performance of cryptographic algorithm/key-length combinations. As Menasce points out, the security methods based on cryptographic technology have constraints on the key size used to meet certain security requirements. In general, the processing time of the symmetric key encryption is exponentially faster than that of the public key encryption. The symmetric key encryption with a secret key shared between two certified users has key management and distribution problems because the quantity of keys increases with the square of the number of communicating parties.
As described above, the use of cryptography-based security mechanism usually needs intensive mathematical computation in deriving or generating keys. A great quantity of memory used to store public parameters is needed when the number of classes or nodes increases. For the conventional authentication techniques based on hard mathematical operations, the use of larger key sizes results in better security but the processing time will be increased greatly.
In order to improve the disadvantages mentioned above, this study proposes a PSoC-based security mechanism with confidentiality and non-repudiation capabilities. The confidentiality is achieved by protecting users' rights to access computer resources. The identification that identifies the user is user-data related while the authenticator that identifies the data belonging to the user is agent-data related. The non-repudiation authentication is supported by using PKI-based authentication protocol for verification/ identification. Additionally, the stream cipher [18] , the authors' previous study, is implemented in an FPGA device to protect database management systems and to defend their related communication protocols against invaders. The proposed privacy enhancing technology not only minimizes the quantity of RAM use to store temporary parameters but also implement simple mathematical operations at a small expense of hardware to process data efficiently. Figure 1 shows the PKI-based system overview of securing computerized personal data during transit and at rest. It consists of four components: E-commerce certificate authority (ECA), affiliated E-commerce merchant database, users' authentication server, and PSoC-based cipher/decipher at user terminal. The ECA manages the certificates and public-private key pairs. The database stores users' encrypted personal identification data (PID). The authentication server interacts with the ECA, encrypted PID database, and PSoC-based user terminal via the authentication protocol. It handles verification/identification processes and stores temporary processed data in the PID buffer. An individual can utilize an IC token or a keyboard to access his PID. The principles of the proposed PSoC-based cipher/decipher and PKI-based authentication protocol are detailed below.
Proposed method

PSoC-based cipher/decipher
As shown in Figure 2 , the proposed PSoC-based cipher/decipher consists of three components: a database system, an 89S51-based programmable microcontroller, and an FPGA device for encryption/decryption. The database system stores uses' computerized personal data; the 89S51-based programmable microcontroller is used to program the encryption/decryption codes; and the FPGA device allows users to implement encryption/decryption algorithm at a small expense of hardware such as EPF10K20RC240-4.
Database system
In this study, we assume that the database system stores users' personal identification information and order information for E-commerce application. The format of personal identification information contains an individual's user name, password, sex (female/male), date of birth, social security number, address, and E-mail. The format of the order information contains product name, product identification, date of order, quantity, price, payment method, status, and total price. Figure 3 shows the circuit schematic of 89S51-based programmable microcontroller. As shown in Figure 3 , the user's personal identification is transmitted from the computer database system to the 89S51 microcontroller byte by byte at first. The 89S51 stores the received PID and then passes the received data to the input of the FPGA. After all the PID data are stored in the ROM of the 89S51, the 89S51 sends the encrypting/decrypting codes based on the algorithm as given in the authors' previous study, stream cipher [18] , byte by byte to the input of the FPGA device via the PORT 0 of the 89S51. The FPGA device processes the received machine codes to generate the encrypted PID; the encrypted PID are then sent byte by byte back to the 89S51 via PORT 2, stored in the 89S51's ROM, and transmitted back to the computer via the RS232.
89S51-based programmable microcontroller
The design of FPGA device
The hardware structure of the encryption/decryption FPGA device is shown in Figure 4 , which includes 6 units: decoding, addressing, register, ALU, memory, and buffers. The decoding unit decodes 8-bit input machine code into three parts: 2-bit instruction, 2-bit addressing mode, and 4-bit operand. Table 1 illustrates the instruction sets used in the FPGA device. There are four kinds of instruction sets: MOV, XOR, Shifting, and Rotating and four kinds of addressing modes: register, register/memory, memory /register, and direct. In addition, there are seven different registers: A, B, C, D, MBR (data buffer register), MAR (address buffer register), and MOR (output buffer register). The 4-bit operand can be either register or address. The memory has 64 bytes. The ALU typically can execute a range of standard arithmetic and logic instructions. 
PKI-based authentication protocol
As illustrated in Figure 5 , the proposed online PKIbased E-commerce transaction protocol consists of the registration process and transaction process. i+1 are automatically generated by taking the PID 0 of the U as the initial value through the random number generator stored in the U's and M's database.
As shown in Figure 5 (a), the U (M) sends the paper application to the ECA to initialize a registration process. The U (M) will receive the PSoC-based cipher/decipher, the C U (C M ), and the public-private key pair from the ECA, where the C U (C M ) basically includes a K, P d Step 2: Verifying the U's identity Upon the confirmation of the validity of the C U , if the U is identified and the decrypted C I of the U is legitimate and the decrypted PID i is valid, the M sends the acknowledgement back to the U. Step3: Updating PID i+1 in the U's and M's database Upon the reception of the acknowledgement from the M, the U updates the PID i+1 in its database system and the M updates the PID i+1 in its database, respectively. 
Experimental results
The proposed approach described above has been simulated using C programming language running on a 1,500MHz Pentium PC with 512 MB of RAM. Figure 6 (a) shows a part of a user's personal identification data. The author observes that the total size of the encrypted PID is 98 bytes, whereas that of the original PID is 84 bytes. This indicates that there is no overhead memory usage. One important feature is that the size of the ciphertext, the size of the key stream, and the encryption time are dependent on the secret key, nonce, and plaintext. This feature indicates that the proposed cipher is much more difficult for the statistical and differential cryptanalysis because the relationship among ciphertexts and key-stream numbers are dynamically associated for each encryption. Additionally, there is no influence on frequent record access because the encryption of numerous users' PID is done off-line. Table  2 summarizes the definitions and countermeasures of four attacks for an opponent from inside or outside the system. One such type of attack is the brute-force attack. In the method proposed, it would take a hacker about 42,000 years to search the entire space of the key PW with no less than 8 keyboard characters [19] . Thus, it is difficult for hackers to break the keys. Another type of attack is the collaborative attack. In order to cooperatively reveal a user's identity, the function F has the security complexity of O (2 n ) [20] with zero knowledge transmission of the key and PID. Thus, it is difficult to achieve collaborative attack. Moreover, because a random number, which is updated for each authentication trail, is used to produce a variant PID ciphertext and to protect the key PW. It is almost impossible to use the information from previous execution to disclose a user's PID and break the key to find out the PID by means of a large number of samples PID ciphertexts. An adversary purports to be another using the information obtained from previous executions. 
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Conclusions
This study has proposed a programmable system-onchip (PSoC) technology to prevent unauthorized users from abusing or disclosing computerized personal data during transit and at rest. The principles for designing this protection technology include two clams. One is that endusers and data owners must have more hands-on participation as safeguards. The other is that the protection technology must use trusted third parties to support origin verification, message integrity, and nonrepudiation capabilities.
The research can be applied in E-commerce activity. An agent can store the keys in both the PSoC system and the agent's database for encryption/decryption. The advantages of the technology are three-fold. First, an agent can install a large number of encrypted users' personal identification data in their databases without excessive overhead processing time. Second, the hardware structure is of low hardware cost and low design complexity; the use of 8-bit instruction length allows better code density. Third, using certificates and dynamic cookies for verification/identification ensures that only authorized users can obtain the access to their personnel record.
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